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This paper focuses on the waste-crime nexus. We discuss which implications different criminological 
approaches to the waste-crime nexus and their respective etiological explanations and views on 
financial incentives hold for crime control and harm prevention. After all, the criminogenic 
opportunities of waste as a product and a sector are utilized by corporations as well as criminal 
organizations. This makes waste crime a topic of research for corporate crime and organized crime 
scholars. Moreover, waste crime is also a topic of green criminological research. For each of these three 
perspectives, we discuss what consequences the theories have for controlling and preventing waste 
crime and whether the contemporary regulation and enforcement answers to these requirements. 
Besides existing criminological studies on waste crime, this paper builds on the finds of our own studies 
on the Dutch waste sector and the Belgian trade in e-waste. We also pay attention to how these three 
criminological perspectives are reflected in reports and recommendations on waste crime by NGOs and 
international governmental organizations. For each of the three perspectives, we discuss a couple of 
prominent cases of waste crime that reflect the framing of the nature and the causes of the theoretical 
perspectives.  
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Introduction 
A rising world population and increased production and consumption generate ever higher quantities 
of waste. By 2050, the approximately 9 billion people on the planet will produce an estimated 13.1 
billion tonnes of waste per year (Hoornweg and Bhada-Tata, 2012; Zoi Environmental Network and 
GRID-Arendal, 2012). The use of chemicals in product manufacturing has also contributed to a higher 
toxicity of waste (Pellow, 2007). From the 1960s, the Global North became increasingly concerned 
about the potential environmental and health hazards in these higher quantities and toxicities of 
waste. These concerns led to the creation of many laws and regulations about waste recovery, disposal 
and transport. Answering to these legal requirements of environmentally sound waste treatment 
implied a much higher cost. This resulted in the waste industry becoming a sector of high economic 
importance (Mathews, Ribeiro, and Vega, 2012; Rucevska et al., 2015).3  
                                                          
1 Assistant Professor at the Erasmus University Rotterdam; bisschop@law.eur.nl. Lieselot Bisschop’s contribution to this work 
was supported by the Research Foundation – Flanders (FWO) Postdoctoral Fellowship funding scheme [FWO14/PDO/013].   
2 Professor of Criminology at the VU Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; w.huisman@vu.nl   
3 This chapter is an adaptation of the following article: Bisschop, L. and Huisman, W. (2016). “Afvalcriminaliteit vanuit drie 
criminologische perspectieven. Implicaties voor preventie en controle.” Cahiers Politiestudies, Vol.38 (Special Issue: Groene 
Criminologie en Veiligheidszorg), pp.111–137. Printed with permission of the publisher.  
2 
 
Waste trade happens for several reasons such as the recovery of secondary materials, the proximity 
of recycling facilities across borders and the existence of specific treatment facilities in few locations. 
The search for cheaper ways to treat and/or dispose of waste is however the most important reason 
behind the trade. The financially most interesting option is often located across borders (European 
Environment Agency, 2012). Both legal and illegal enterprises are keen to pocket those high profits 
(Ruggiero and South, 2010). In fact, the transition from legal to illegal can occur at several stages of 
the waste process such as national and cross-border transport, in collection or disposal (Passas, 1999).  
Illegal waste disposal is one of the first topics that was defined as environmental crime (Block and 
Scarpitti, 1985; Szasz, 1986) and thus became part of ‘green criminology’ research (South, 1998a, 
1998b). Long before the emergence of this sub-discipline, waste crime was studied from other 
criminological perspectives. The criminogenic opportunities of waste as a product and as a sector are 
abused by both corporations and criminal organizations, making waste crime the topic of corporate 
and organized crime research.   
Studying a phenomenon within a specific criminological research tradition impacts its framing – and 
therefore the way in which the phenomenon is defined and characterized. This influences theoretical 
explanations about the nature and causes of the phenomenon, which in turn impacts the crime 
prevention or control policy and thus the ways in which police and other security services address it.  
A clear example of this is the conclusion of the Dutch Organized Crime Monitor that organized crime 
happens in social networks, which resulted in a crime control strategy of targeting offenders that 
occupy crucial ‘nodes’ in these networks (Kleemans and Kruissink, 1999; Kleemans, 2014a). Of course, 
police work is more often informed by forms of crime that affect and concern citizens most directly 
and visibly. Organized and corporate crime does not seem to be high on civilians’ lists of concerns 
(Devroe and Ponsaers, 2015). However, we consider it a responsibility of criminologists to translate 
scientific insights about crime to implications for policy making.  
In this chapter, we therefore aim to explicitly connect theory to practice. Our central question is which 
implications different criminological approaches to the waste-crime nexus and their respective 
etiological explanations hold for crime control and harm prevention. To answer this question, we build 
on three criminological perspectives on waste crime: waste as organized crime, waste as corporate 
crime and waste from a green criminology perspective. For each of these three perspectives, we 
discuss what consequences the theories – and views on the role of illicit gains of waste crime – have 
for controlling and preventing waste crime and whether the contemporary regulation and 
enforcement answers to these requirements.  
Besides drawing from existing criminological studies on waste crime, this paper builds on the findings 
of our own studies on the Dutch waste sector (Huisman 2001; Van Erp and Huisman, 2010; Huisman 
and van Erp, 2013) and the Belgian trade in e-waste (Bisschop 2015). We also pay attention to how 
these three criminological perspectives are reflected in reports and recommendations on waste crime 
by NGOs and international governmental organizations. For each of the three perspectives, we discuss 
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a couple of prominent cases of waste crime that reflect the framing of the nature and the causes of 
the theoretical perspectives. 4 
In the following part of this article, we discuss what waste crime is and how waste as a sector and 
product creates criminogenic opportunities for illicit gain. Next, we discuss the involvement of 
organized crime groups in waste crime, after which we turn to a review of the role of legitimate 
companies in waste crime. Then, we analyse waste crime from a green criminological perspective. In 
the discussion, we discuss how these three perspectives relate to each other and propose an 
integrated strategy for the prevention and control of waste crime. 
Waste and crime 
Whenever there is no further purpose for a product or substance, be it in production or consumption, 
waste is generated. Waste treatment is the process that changes the characteristics of the waste to 
facilitate its handling, to make recovery of secondary raw materials possible or to reduce the quantity 
and hazardous nature (Williams et al. 2013). Waste disposal is the final phase which can refer to 
landfill, incineration and dumping. Waste can refer to a variety of materials such as glass, metal, paper, 
textiles, plastic or organic material (or a mix thereof). It can also be classified based on sectors of 
everyday life, such as households, agriculture, mining, energy production, manufacturing and 
construction. Also illicit activities such as drug production generate waste. When substances create 
extra risks for harming the environment and human health, such waste may be labelled as toxic or 
hazardous waste. This brings challenges for ecologically sound treatment, which usually also means 
extra costs. 
Waste crimes refer to the trade, treatment or disposal of waste in ways that breach international or 
domestic environmental legislation and cause harm or risk to the environment and human health. This 
can refer to administrative/regulatory violations (e.g. in case of non-compliance with license 
requirements) as well as breaches of criminal law (e.g. deliberately causing harm). Many cases of non-
compliance with waste regulation are, in fact, dealt with by regulatory agencies and might not even 
come to the attention of police or justice officials. Moreover, many violations of waste regulation do 
not require specific actions; they are often violations exactly because required actions to adhere to 
regulatory requirements were not taken (Huisman and van Erp, 2013). Many waste crimes thus equal 
crimes of omission, albeit often with very conscious inaction. Some waste crimes do require specific 
actions such as in the dumping of hazardous waste and constitute crimes of commission. Further, 
illegal trafficking of waste often includes fraudulent activities, such as falsifying loading bills or lab 
reports. 
A number of sector and product specific characteristics help explain the connection between waste 
and crime. The criminogenic character of waste relates, in part, to the development of the sector and 
the regulatory framework. Today, the waste sector is heavily regulated, but prior to the 1980s there 
were hardly any laws about the management of and trade in (hazardous) waste. Around that time, 
chemical disasters such as Three-Mile Island (1979) and Chernobyl (1986), both of which involved 
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radioactive waste, and the Love Canal case (mid 1970s), where a neighbourhood was built on land 
formerly used as an industrial chemical dumpsite (see Levine 1982 for details), raised public concern 
about (hazardous) waste generation and disposal in industrialized nations. Once the waste sector 
within industrialized nations was more strictly regulated, the export of hazardous waste to countries 
with lower environmental standards and therefore lower costs for treatment and/or disposal became 
commonplace. When several disturbing cases of toxic waste exports from industrialized to developing 
countries were exposed, these hazardous waste exports were criminalized in international law.5 The 
increased regulation of the industry  made the prices for environmentally sound waste treatment 
skyrocket. The globalized waste marked however continued to provide opportunities for both legal 
and illegal profits (Pellow 2007).  The rapid growth and international character of the sector allowed a 
diversity of actors to work in the waste industry, with brokers and subcontractors involved at different 
stages (Szasz 1986). In collection, transport and treatment, multiple smaller companies try to compete 
with the few big ones (Vander Beken, 2007). Combining that with high profit margins and a small 
chance of getting caught, this is a breeding ground for cutting corners and exploiting legislative 
loopholes. This is especially true because regulation and enforcement has not kept pace with this 
global market space (Tompson and Chainey 2011).  
The waste sector is an un-level global playing field, with asymmetries between countries in laws, 
politics, culture, knowledge and awareness. These asymmetries are criminogenic because they foster 
the demand for illegal goods or services, are an incentive to participate in illegal markets and hamper 
the ability of authorities to control (Passas 1999, 402). Whereas many countries have ratified and 
implemented the international legal framework for (hazardous) waste trade, many others have not, 
which results in legal and law enforcement asymmetries, and consequently in jurisdiction (s)hopping 
in search of the most favourable (illegal) agreement or for the space between the laws (Clapp, 2002; 
Heckenberg, 2010). This goes hand in hand with asymmetries in knowledge and awareness about the 
dangers of substandard treatment and disposal of (hazardous) waste. Moreover, there are economic 
asymmetries between regions of the world, which can lead countries to accept financially interesting 
waste transports into their country despite an absence of facilities for treatment or disposal (Bisschop, 
2012). Those harmed by this illegal trade often do not have the economic means nor political power 
to oppose the polluters (Mohai and Saha, 2007). 
We have explained why the waste sector is considered to be crime-facilitative, but also waste as a 
product is criminogenic (Gobert and Punch 2003). Waste allows for fairly easy disguises by mixing it up 
with less hazardous waste, mislabelling it or selling it as second-hand commodities (Gibbs, McGarrell, 
and Axelrod 2010). Recyclable material is for instance used to hide hazardous waste or household 
waste is mixed with hazardous waste and then dumped. Other fraudulent techniques used are the 
falsification of customs forms by using non-hazardous waste or product codes to classify hazardous 
waste. Traders under- or over-invoice to disguise waste shipments. An increasing number of 
containers, containing hazardous waste, are also abandoned in ports throughout the world (Rucevska 
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et al. 2015). Expensive environmentally sound waste treatment means an inverse incentive structure 
for waste. In contrast to many other industries, waste treatment companies are paid before they incur 
any costs for treatment and/or disposal. This makes it very tempting to limit the costs and maximize 
the profits without regard for regulation (Huisman 2001). This makes waste crime a low risk and high 
profit phenomenon (Rucevska et al., 2015). 
As illustrated above, waste as a global sector and as a product creates ample criminogenic 
opportunities and incentives for illicit gain. In what follows, we analyse waste crime from three 
criminological perspectives: organized crime, corporate crime and green criminology. For each 
perspective, we pay attention to the theories used, take note of a couple of prominent cases and 
discuss implications for crime prevention and control.  
Waste and organized crime 
Organized crime theory and waste 
Organized crime is one of those types of crime that does not easily lend itself to a clear definition as 
illustrated by the multitude of existing definitions in scientific literature and policy documents (Von 
Lampe 2017). Over the years these definitions have shifted between who and what notions of 
organized crime and are now often settling on a combination of the two. The former notion refers to 
stable partnerships of criminals who systematically engage in crime (organized crime groups), whereas 
the latter refers to serious criminal activities in more loosely organized structures (Paoli and Van der 
Beken 2014). Organized crime can involve many types of crime (fraud, embezzlement, money 
laundering, racketeering, extortion, human trafficking, drug trafficking, etc.) and many types of actors 
who on their own do not constitute a criminal organization, but do so in interaction (Finckenauer 
2005). Organized crime is often defined as complex criminal organizations that aim to control illegal 
markets - and even branch out to legal markets – and attain control by means of violence and/or 
corruption. However, it changes with new criminal opportunities arising and its definition thus requires 
flexibility (Von Lampe 2008). Moreover, differentiating between organized crime and corporate crime 
is not always easy, because there are many interfaces between the two (Ruggiero, 1996). Organized 
crime is inextricably intertwined with legal activities and companies and is socially embedded 
(Kleemans and Van de Bunt, 2008; Van de Bunt, Siegel and Zaitch 2014). In case of bigger corporations, 
the corporate crime argument is usually quite clear, but much smaller corporate entities might have 
been created with criminal intentions. In (Dutch) practice, police investigations concerning 
environmental crime often focus on small, almost marginal, companies (Huisman and van Erp, 2013). 
When defining waste crime as organized, this refers to perpetrators who systematically commit these 
offenses and who created their organization or cooperation with that criminal intent. Illicit activities 
are their primary raison d'être and these waste crimes go hand in hand with forgery, tax fraud, money 
laundering, corruption, extortion, etc.  
Definitions and theories concerning organized crime therefore need to be dynamic in order to account 
for new developments in society (Kleemans 2014b). Recent criminal policy often uses organized crime 
in combination with serious crime. Also environmental crime cases often involve serious crime and 
have demonstrated the interconnectedness of organized crime groups with legal actors. Distinctions 
between these activities and labels are therefore not always clear-cut. and 
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Although this chapter provides examples of organized crime involvement in waste crimes, it is 
necessary to keep in mind that different countries have different conceptualizations. Using a fairly 
narrow definition of organized crime, referring strictly to organized crime groups as Mafia-like 
organizations, Italy for instance does not report any organized crime group involvement in 
environmental crime. Germany, using the definition of the Bundes Kriminal Amt (BKA) reports 7 cases 
in 2011 and 8 in 2012 (environmental crime overall, not specific to waste). During those same years, 
the Netherlands reports 34 and 42 prosecutions of environmental organized crime cases 
(EnviCrimeNet 2014, 2014:18).6 “Whereas the term organized crime still has strong evocative power, 
which undoubtedly explains its political success, the many different criminal actors and activities that 
have been subsumed under this make it a vague umbrella concept, as a basis for empirical analyses, 
theory-building or policy-making.” (Paoli and Vander Beken 2014, p.13). These conceptual difficulties 
render assessments of the scope of organized crime involvement in waste crimes (and other 
environmental crimes) and cross country comparisons difficult. 
Cases 
Many official reports conclude that organized crime plays an important role in the illegal trade and 
dumping of (hazardous) waste (Europol, 2015; IMPEL-TFS, 2012; Interpol, 2009; UNODC, 2012). The 
connection between waste and organized crime is not new. To the contrary, this has been discussed 
for decades, especially related to the United States and Italy (Ruggiero, 1996; Szasz, 1986). We discuss 
these two countries because they can be considered prominent cases. Afterwards, we broaden the 
scope to other countries. 
In the United States of the 1970s and 1980s, organized criminals virtually monopolized the collection 
and disposal of waste, especially in the states of New Jersey and New York (Block 2002; Szasz 1986). 
Disguised as legitimate firms (e.g. USA Waste; Waste Management), organized crime groups 
dominated the solid waste industry. These criminal waste practices ranged from predatory pricing, 
over mixing of hazardous and non-hazardous waste, to dumping of toxic waste. A parliamentary 
inquiry demonstrated the relationships of these waste firms with public officials.  Regulators failed to 
effectively deal with the overcharging by the waste collectors, amounting to double or triple the prices 
of other major US cities, and they also failed to address the systemic corruption. These organized crime 
groups even resorted to vandalism, violence and threats towards their customers and potential 
competitors to establish and uphold their monopoly, including two murders (Jacobs, Friel, and Radick 
1992). Similar waste hauling racketeering happened in other US cities such as Boston and Chicago, 
which were later settled in anti-trust cases (Block 2002). The connection of the waste industry and 
organized crime in the United States is not merely something of the past. In a 2013 US Federal District 
Court case, 32 people – member of La Cosa Nostra families - were indicted for crimes in the garbage 
hauling industry (Department of Justice, 2013; Rashbaum and Goldstein 2013). 
Similar to the US, the involvement of organized crime in the Italian waste industry has long been 
recognized (Massari and Monzini, 2004). An estimated 20,000 tonnes of hazardous waste disappears 
every year, either dumped at sea or illegally transported and dumped outside of Italy’s borders (Alessio 
D’Amato et al. 2014). One modus operandi is the invoice switch (giro bolla) in which hazardous waste 
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goes from the producer to a temporary storage facility which changes the documents from hazardous 
to non-hazardous without actually treating the waste (Alessio D’Amato and Zoli 2011). The trade in 
waste is allegedly controlled by ‘Ndrangheta, La Cosa Nostra and Camorra, that ship it to Eastern 
European or West African countries, dumping the waste in construction sites or landfills or selling it as 
fertilizer (Liddick 2009; Eman 2013; Legambiente, 2014). Italy also has about 5,000 illegal landfill sites, 
especially in the region of Campania which hardly produces any waste (Senior and Mazza, 2004). 
Corruption of local authorities helps these illegal organizations to continue their business largely 
undisturbed (A D’Amato and Zoli 2011; Past, 2013). 
A lot of the academic publications and government reports refer to the US and Italy when discussing 
organized crime involvement in waste crimes. Reports about other countries rarely mention specific 
cases. 
The Interpol Pollution Crime Working Group (Interpol 2009; INTERPOL Pollution Crime Working Group 
2009) reported about the illegal import and export of waste, ozone-depleting substances and e-waste, 
and about the illegal dumping of hazardous waste. They report that the complexity of the waste 
legislation makes it difficult to clearly delineate legal and illegal activities. Also Europol identified the 
illegal trade in waste as an important threat for European member states and stresses the importance 
of proactive approaches because criminal markets and methods are flexible (Europol, 2011, 2015). 
Both organizations refer to business-like structures and loosely organized involvement of organized 
criminals, who work together for specific criminal opportunities and then form new groups, rather 
than hierarchically structured organized crime. Some of these more loosely organized networks do 
have international connections and try to assume power over legal waste treatment or transport 
companies. 
In the November 2011, EnviCrimeNet was created in Europe, under the auspices of Europol. One of 
Envicrimenet’s activities has been an  Intelligence Project on Environmental Crime focused on 
intelligence gathering about the involvement, vulnerabilities and threats of organized crime groups in 
environmental crime. Their first report (EnviCrimeNet 2014) links environmental crimes to money 
laundering, fraud, forgery, corruption and even terrorism and drug trafficking. It states that the threat 
and extent of environmental crime is overall underestimated, partially due to a lack of information 
about the involvement of organized crime groups. As mentioned earlier, the Netherlands prosecuted 
several organized environmental crime cases in recent years. These concerned illegal collection, 
(international) trade, storage and dumping of hazardous waste and e-waste (EnviCrimeNet, 2014). 
Several of the criminal groups were intertwined with legal companies through money laundering, 
illegal construction and corruption. In a couple of cases there was a connection to drugs and human 
trafficking. The Southern part of the Netherlands for instance has several cases of dumping of chemical 
waste resulting from the production of synthetic drugs. Environmental criminals who used to work 
alone, get together in criminal groups. Another analysis of Dutch waste crime police investigations 
found no connection to drugs, human or weapons trafficking (Neve 2013). For the illegal export of 
waste from Belgium to African countries, there is often some degree of organization with the so-called 
‘waste tourists’, evident from their falsified passports and interconnections (Bisschop, 2012).  
Organized crime is an area that comes with mythical numbers and attempts to criticize them might be 
perceived as a way to claim the topic is not important (Calderoni 2014). While the various reports by 
governmental and non-governmental organizations mainly present the assumption that the waste 
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industry is vulnerable to organized crime, empirical research and the available cases mainly show 
waste-crime that is committed by mostly licit companies in the waste industry (see later). Organized 
crime in the traditional interpretation of Mafia-like stable criminal organizations might not be the 
primary type of crime involved in the waste business, with the American and Italian cases as the well-
known exceptions. Instead, more flexible cooperation focused on the illicit acticities, often intertwined 
with corporate forms of organized crime have taken their place (Carter 1999). The interconnectedness 
of illegal trade with the legal economy is obvious and often it concerns fraud and tax evasion (serious 
crime) rather than organized crime in the strict sense of the word. The involvement of organized crime 
groups is therefore not always apparent.  
Implications for crime prevention and control 
Labelling waste crime as organized crime implies that the governance response is one of traditional 
crime control, policing of illegal markets and trying to eliminate and deter perpetrators. Police 
organizations, whether working within national borders or cooperating internationally, are challenged 
in their reporting about organized crime. As discussed above, the differences in definitions of organized 
crime, make a systematic comparison across countries and regions difficult. This is even more true for 
environmental crime, because it often receives low-priority on policy agendas. This is especially 
difficult when there is a suspicion of government authorities being involved in the waste crime, either 
directly or by facilitating it. A policy analysis in the region of Campania (Italy) has for instance shown 
that the lack of effective responses to the waste issue goes hand in hand with a failure of democracy 
(Burgalassi et al. 2010). This refers to a lack of involvement of locals in decision making processes 
despite these locals being the first to be affected by the waste crisis in the region. 
Waste as organized crime implies a high priority for crime control, especially compared to corporate 
crime (see later). Organized crime is often investigated from a ‘follow the money’ point of view 
(Kleemans, 2014a). This can also be relevant for waste crime. Money laundering investigations can be 
an inspiration. A recent evaluation of financial investigation in Dutch environmental crime cases 
stressed the potentiality of such an approach (Neve and Van Zanden, this volume). This is currently put 
in practice in one Belgian police district that assigned environmental crime investigations to (chief) 
investigators with financial investigation expertise.7  
Moreover, contemporary crime investigations and strategic analyses increasingly focus on intervening 
in the logistical processes of organized crime and on removing situational opportunities (Bullock, 
Clarke, and Tilley, 2010; Spapens, 2011). Considering waste crime as organized provides the possibility 
to apply these approaches, even though the first practical experience with them has delivered few 
specific leads for new crime control or prevention strategies (Huisman and van Erp, 2013; Neve, 2013). 
Script analysis can be useful to identify modus operandi and involved actors (both legal and illegal) 
(Sahramäki et al 2016). However, challenges remain in implementing this in enforcement practice 
because it also requires policy makers and enforcement agencies to analyse how they might 
(un)consciously facilitate (undermining) criminal activities (Kolthoff and Khonraad, 2016).  
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The involvement of organized criminals in waste crime is not always clear, as has been explained 
earlier. A partial explanation lies in the limited reporting and investigation of waste trafficking, which 
results in few to no criminal groups being identified (Eurojust, 2014). Remaining challenges are cross-
border cooperation in investigating and prosecuting waste crime (Eurojust, 2014; Spapens and 
Huisman, 2016). The few cases prosecuted in countries where waste trafficking is discovered often rely 
on judicial proceedings in countries of origin. This is usually a lengthy process and countries do not 
always keep each other posted (Bisschop, 2015). The EU’s Environmental Crime Directive requires 
member states to install ‘effective, proportionate and discouraging sanctions’ for environmental 
crime. In practice, prosecution rarely occurs and sanctioning even less (Eurojust, 2014). There are 
several reasons for this. The use of special investigative techniques for waste crimes is impossible in 
many countries because they are classified as too low to be considered serious crime. Too little high 
quality information is gathered to result in meaningful intelligence. Witness statements from countries 
of destination of the waste are often not considered admissible in court. Often the shipper, 
successfully, claims he did not know about the legislation and criminal intent cannot be proven. An 
absence of technical expertise is also common. As a consequence, police and justice officials often 
prosecute for the ‘traditional’ crimes and not the environmental ones.    
Waste and corporate crime 
Corporate crime theory and waste 
In their landmark study on crimes committed by America’s 70 largest corporations, Clinard and Yeager 
defined corporate crime as “any act committed by corporations that is punished by the state, 
regardless of whether it is punished under administrative, civil or criminal law” (Clinard and Yeager 
1980, 16). Criminologists disagree on whether the definition should be limited to breaches of criminal 
law or rather not be limited to law breaking at all. There is also disagreement about whether the 
corporation itself or corporate managers should be seen as perpetrators, resulting in the development 
of alternative definitions of corporate crime. Despite these differences, scholars generally agree that 
corporate crimes are primarily committed for the corporate benefit in contrast to other forms of white-
collar crime which benefit the individual. Although the distinction between organized and corporate 
crime has been criticized, the former is mostly seen as an informal organization of people working 
together with the sole purpose of committing crimes, while corporate crime involves formal 
organizations without an organizational goal to commit crimes that commit crimes to achieve these 
goals (Friedrichs, 2010). While corporate crimes are sometimes portrayed as victimless, or as merely 
producing economic harm, many types also produce physical harm. According to Friedrichs (2010, 65), 
corporate contributions to poisoning the environment may well be the most common form of such 
‘corporate violence’. 
As discussed above, waste is the inevitable by-product of production and consumption processes of 
economies on the rise. Waste problems can be traced back to Ancient Rome, but waste became 
particularly problematic after the nineteenth century industrialization and for many developing 
economies it is increasingly cumbersome today (Hoornweg and Bhada-Tata 2012). Hazardous waste 
dumping has always been harmful, but it only became a crime problem when the production, transport 
and treatment of waste was regulated more strictly. 
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Corporate waste crime comes in two types: waste production and waste treatment. Crime in waste 
production occurs when corporations dump types or quantities of waste in breach of the requirements 
of their license or when they dispose waste in absence of a license. This can concern waste water, air 
pollution or other (hazardous) waste streams resulting from industrial processes. Case studies show 
that many of these corporations either knew or should have known the inherent risks in dumping 
hazardous waste, but still opted for dangerous low cost methods of disposal. Furthermore, they 
typically resisted changing these practices until forced to do so and actively lobbied against 
environmental legislation outlawing these practices (Friedrichs 2010, 66).  
Besides industries producing waste and getting rid of it in an illegal manner, companies in the 
collection, transport and processing of waste produced by others can be involved in environmental 
crimes. As explained above, the waste industry is highly regulated in many industrialized countries 
because of the potential environmental risks of – especially hazardous – waste processing. The legal 
obligation to process waste in an environmentally responsible manner created a market for the 
services of waste hauling and processing companies. In the 1980s, the costs for the legal processing of 
hazardous waste were approximately 2500 USD per tonne, whereas many developing countries 
accepted this waste for maybe 3 USD per tonne, making it more cost efficient to ship waste to the 
Caribbean than shipping it 60 kilometres within state borders (Rosoff, Pontell, and Tillman, 2007, p. 
166). In some cases, the profit opportunity, just by collecting waste, seems to be the sole business 
strategy (Huisman and van Erp, 2013). In corporate crime cases, business activities are often seemingly 
designed for proper handling of waste, but once the waste is collected – and the money is in the pocket 
– the temptation of cheap substandard treatment or outright dumping is high. Criminological 
handbooks on corporate and white collar crimes are not the only ones that consider corporations as 
the main culprits for waste crimes. Also environmental NGOs such as Greenpeace or the Basel Action 
Plan often label corporations as waste criminals, for instance related to the illegal disposal of e-waste 
(Kuper and Hojsik, 2008).  
So, while the waste industry was meant to prevent environmental harm, it is seen as vulnerable for 
corporate and organized crime (Vander Beken 2007). As discussed above, the waste industry in Italy 
and the United States has been associated with organized crime. In contrast, studies have associated 
the waste industry in the Netherlands with corporate crime. The 1980s and 1990s witnessed several 
high profile criminal cases against waste processing companies such as Tanker Cleaning Rotterdam. 
While the Netherlands are not alone in having corporate waste crime cases, it is quite unique that it 
resulted in parliamentary inquiries and subsequent criminological studies. The parliamentary inquiry 
charged the research team Fijnaut with investigating the alleged infiltration of the waste sector by 
organized crime (given the Italian and American examples). Instead, the studies showed that 
established companies in the waste industry were committing crimes and that several characteristics 
of the waste industry facilitated environmental crime (van Vugt and Boet 1994; Bruinsma 1996; van 
den Berg 1995; van den Anker and Hoogenboom 1997). The first characteristic is the previously 
discussed reversed incentive structure. However, Van Wingerde (2012, 85) claimed this to be largely a 
thing of the past as waste processing firms nowadays often have long-term contracts with waste 
producing companies. Second, the waste regulations are complex, fail to regulate the entire market 
and have trouble keeping up with the dynamic character of it. Third, some firms hold monopoly 
positions while others control many or all segments of the disposal chain (Vander Beken 2007). Recent 
mergers and up-scaling have increased this problem. Hence, effective industry monitoring is even 
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harder to achieve whereas illegal practices are easily covered up. This combination of factors offers 
ample opportunity to commit violations with impunity (van de Bunt and Huisman, 2007). 
Cases 
Among the best known cases of corporate pollution is the Love Canal case. Throughout the 1920s, 
1930s and 1940s, a canal near Niagara Falls (New York) served as a municipal dumpsite and later as an 
industrial dumpsite for the Hooker Chemical Company (Levine 1982). About 20,000 tonnes of metal 
drums filled with highly toxic chemical waste were dumped there. After the closure of the dump-site, 
near the end of the 1950s, the land was sold for US$1 to the city who later built a school and residential 
neighbourhood for over 1000 families on it. For years, residents complained of odours and substances 
bubbling up near houses or playgrounds, unaware of the toxic waste under their feet. A health study 
later confirmed the serious health problems residents and school children had been suffering for 
decades (cancer, birth defects, miscarriages, etc). Eventually hundreds of families were evacuated 
form the area and about 70 acres of land were fenced off. The company was compelled to pay US$20 
million to former residents (Friedrichs 2010). In the aftermath, the US created the so-called Superfund 
to clean up hazardous waste dumpsites. 
A more contemporary illustration is that of the 2006 toxic waste dumping which was connected to 
Trafigura and the ship Probo Koala they chartered (van Wingerde 2015). The waste was a residue of a 
process of upgrading low quality coker naphta to fuel oil by treating it with caustic soda, which was 
carried out on board the vessel. The coker naphta  came from Mexico and  was transported over land 
to the US where it started its journey aboard the Probo Koala. Twelve trucks loaded with toxic slob 
that had resulted from the upgrading process  were dumped on 18 locations near the city of Abidjan 
in Ivory Coast. 108,000 people needed medical attention and 15 people died, although Trafigura 
vehemently denied these figures as well as causality. These toxic slops had previously been sent to a 
Tunisia refinery Tankmed for washing, where the refinery refused further washings after workers 
complained of terrible smells. Trafigura then decided to do the washings on board the Probo Koala, 
resulting in 554 tonnes of hazardous slops. There were several failed attempts to dispose the waste in 
other countries (Malta, Italy and Gibraltar) (van Wingerde 2015). On route for Estonia to load a gasoline 
cargo, Trafigura asked for a quote from Amsterdam Port Services (APS) in the Netherlands to treat the 
slop. The quote based on Trafigura’s description of the contents as ‘gasoline slops’ that resulted from 
regular operation of the ship was €27 per m3 but after taking samples and finding out what the slops 
were actually composed of APS significantly increased the quote (€1000 per m3), which Trafigura 
rejected. They attempted to unload the waste in Nigeria but eventually ended up in Ivory Coast despite 
an absence of suitable treatment facilities in that country. In Ivory Coast, Compagnie Tommy, a 
company that had a license (since one month) but neither the facilities nor the human resources to 
handle this, was contracted to deal with the ‘slops’ for €30per m3. After the vessel had offloaded the 
waste in Ivory Coast, the Probo Koala set sail for Estonia, after which it was blocked by Greenpeace 
and court cases started in Ivory Coast, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and France. In 2007, 
Trafigura (and its Ivory Coast subsidiary Puma Energy) received immunity from criminal prosecution in 
Ivory Coast following a financial settlement of €152 million but without admitting liability (Greenpeace 
and Amnesty International 2012; van Wingerde, 2015). In 2009, Trafigura reached a settlement in 
British courts, agreeing to pay approximately 950 GBP to each of the 30,000 claimants. In 2012, after 
several years of criminal investigations, court proceedings and appeals, Trafigura and the Dutch 
prosecution office reached a settlement of €1 million. This is undoubtedly a case of illegal trade and 
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dumping of hazardous waste, in a complex construction of several companies (Trafigura, its 
subsidiaries and companies they hired) and countries (Mexico, USA, the Netherlands, Ivory Coast). This 
has even been called a state-corporate crime given the failure of the Ivory Coast authorities to respond 
(MacManus 2012). The Probo Koala case illustrates “that legal and economic complexities can make it 
difficult to effectively enforce and prosecute corporate environmental crime” (van Wingerde 2015: 
265).  
Another type of industrial waste, albeit a very different one, are discarded end-of-life vessels. 
Approximately 12,000 vessels become obsolete each year, because they are no longer sea-worthy, 
because they no longer answer to the requirements (e.g. double hull) set by the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) or because the economic context makes it more profitable to dismantle the ships 
for parts and secondary raw materials than to keep it in business (NGO Shipbreaking Platform 2013). 
The shipbreaking industry reclaims the valuable steel and other metals but also has to deal with toxic 
substances such as asbestos, lead, mercury, residual oil and polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). When 
handled in unsafe ways by beaching the ships, these toxins affect the health of the workers and leak 
into the coastal and marine environment (Neşer, Ünsalan, Tekoğul, and Stuer-Lauridsen, 2008). By 
beaching these vessels in developing countries, the shipping industry flouts international regulations 
on hazardous waste although those regulations long ignored this particular aspect of the waste trade 
and there are many loopholes to exploit (Rousmaniere and Raj 2007). Most of those vessels change 
owners in the last years and months of travel and use flags of convenience to arrive at their final 
destinations (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh), thereby disguising the original owner. Part of the 
responsibility for these waste crimes thus lies with the shipping industry and original owners of the 
vessels, who neglected to check where their vessels eventually end up. Shipbreaking by beaching is 
the result of a complex criminogenic interplay of economic actors (shipping lines, financial institutions, 
cash buyers, classification companies, shipping yards) and political actors (port states, flag states, tax 
havens) on national as well as international level (Claeys 2017). 
We explained earlier how waste collection and processing in the United States has historic connections 
to organized crime groups, but the waste management corporations that took their place after the 
crackdown on organized crime do not have flawless track records either. They “possess extensive 
histories of chronic violations of environmental law, as well as convictions for antitrust violations such 
as restraint of trade, price-fixing, and bid-rigging.” (Carter 1999, 24). These same companies have been 
charged with and sometimes convicted for bribing public officials. In other words, their activities are 
very similar to those of their mafia-predecessors. 
Illegal waste shipments are sometimes classified as shipments of products in an attempt to evade 
waste regulations. A 2001 case involved the discovery of two leaking containers in the port of 
Rotterdam with paperwork indicating chemicals (legal trade), not the 300 tonnes of mixed expired 
hazardous waste (illegal trade) that it actually was (EPA 2006, cited in Rucevska et al. 2015). The origin 
of these containers was a US storage facility that had illegally stored chemicals, which the US EPA had 
ordered to the clean-up. The storage company then attempted to trade the chemical waste illegally by 
sending 29 containers to Nigeria, for dumping purposes. In transit in the port of Rotterdam, customs 
discovered that the buyer in Nigeria did not exist and started an investigation, discovering the illegal 
trade.  
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In a study into the illegal trade in electronic waste between Belgium and Ghana (Bisschop 2012), there 
was a connection to corporate crime in the waste sector. Several stages of the waste process held 
potential for illegal trade and dumping. The practices of some refurbishment companies and collectors 
of e-waste fed into illegal e-waste trade. Scrap metal dealers are intermediaries in the collection of e-
waste and facilitate the waste fraud. This is consistent with findings by the Interpol Enigma operation, 
which resulted in criminal investigations into 40 companies for illegal e-waste trade (Interpol 2013). 
Some shipping agents also facilitate the smuggling or hinder law enforcement by obscuring the paper 
trail. With the increasing importance of the online marketplace, there are also companies selling e-
waste online (e.g., Craigslist, Marketplace, Kapaza, Alibaba, ScrapMetalForum, Ebay, etc.).   
Several illegal waste practices – whether in collection, processing or disposal - are intertwined with 
legal waste and transport activities, taking advantage of lacking regulation and enforcement. Even 
some prominent waste companies with ISO certification who advertise sustainable practices are 
involved in waste fraud (Rucevska et al. 2015). Legal entities sometimes outsource their waste 
treatment and disposal, later claiming they did not know about the illegal dumping practices or 
substandard treatment, albeit that the cheap prices offered for treatment could have been cause for 
suspicion (Bisschop 2015). Overall, this makes clear that waste crime is undoubtedly connected to 
corporations and therefore a corporate crime. 
Implications for crime prevention and control 
Labelling waste crime as corporate crime implies that the governance response is one of regulating 
legal markets and monitoring compliance (Huisman 2014). Contrary to organized crime, part of the 
corporate waste crimes are crimes of omission (see above): the environmental regulations require 
companies to take action to avoid harmful substances pollute the environment. Rule compliance 
requires the investment of time and money; non-compliance saves time and money. In order to 
prevent and detect violations, regulatory agencies are required to (pro-)actively enforce these rules. 
Studies have shown repeatedly that environmental law enforcement knows many practical difficulties 
(Hawkins, 1984; Hutter, 1997). Even though computerization has facilitated information exchange 
among regulatory agencies, the interpretation of waste regulations and the systematic monitoring of 
compliance remain problematic (Kluin 2014). 
Since the 1980s, environmental governance in general, and for waste in particular, is partially 
entrusted to corporations (Huisman, 2001; Van Wingerde, 2012). Self-regulation is often financially 
interesting for corporations, it helps to protect the company’s reputation or it helps to ward off more 
intrusive regulation or anticipate a future tightening of rules (Bartley 2007; Gunningham, Kagan, and 
Thornton 2003). Studies have shown that self-regulation can work (de Bree 2011), but it does not 
necessarily encompass the entire waste market from collection over treatment to disposal. In a 
situation of self-regulation, governments are often meta-regulators, who check the companies before 
granting licenses and also check their functioning afterwards, albeit often sporadically. This system is 
often visualized by means of a pyramid of responsive regulation, persuading companies to compliance 
when the “slippery slope will inexorably lead to a sticky end” (Braithwaite 2008, 93–94), which means 
revoking licenses or applying criminal justice in case of serious or repeat violations. However, a recent 
study of the general deterrent effect of sanctioning in the waste industry in the Netherland showed 
that it only works for those companies that least need it: only those firms that are already actively 
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managing compliance are receptive to the normative signals send by punitive sanctions (Van Wingerde 
2012). Corporate waste crime thus remains an issue of active and unwavering prevention and control.  
Waste from a green criminological perspective 
Green criminological theory and waste 
When approaching waste crime from a green criminological perspective, a first concern is the 
definition of crime. Although it would take us too far out of the scope of this chapter to discuss the 
details about defining environmental crime and harm, it means that a mere judicial definition of 
environmental crime is too narrow as much environmentally harmful behaviour escapes the 
boundaries of national legislation. Therefore, environmental harm should be the core focus, no matter 
whether it is officially classified as a regulatory infringement (Halsey and White, 1998; South, 1998a). 
This refers to immediately noticeable or measurable harm, but also harm that only manifests itself 
after a longer period of time or that is harmful across borders (White, 2011). Victims can refer to people 
but also animals, plants or ecosystems (Hall 2015). This for instance refers to the effect that pollution 
– a type of waste – has on the air, water or soil quality, even when this concerns only minimal quantities 
that cause damage only after prolonged exposure. Studying victimization from a green criminology 
perspective is therefore not limited to an antropocentric perspective but is ecocentric (White and 
Heckenberg, 2014). 
A second topic of importance are the causes of waste crime. Because green criminology is inspired by 
critical criminology, the role of the powerful in the emergence of environmental harm is studied and 
empirical causality is inextricably linked to normative questions about responsibility. A green 
criminology view on corporate crime implies that corporations are explicitly named as culprits and not 
merely individuals within those corporations. This refers to companies that collect, treat and produce 
waste but do not bother much about the rules for environmentally sound waste handling. However, a 
green criminology is not so much interested in the criminogenic characteristics of corporations that 
violate environmental laws. Such corporations are viewed as being part of a political-economic system 
that produces ecological disorganization. Especially the concept of the ‘treadmill of production’ 
describes how environmental harms are the direct result of the process of economic production, 
economic growth and capital accumulation under the capitalist mode of production (Lynch, Long, 
Barrett and Stretesky, 2013). This also refers to the influence of those same powerful actors on policy 
making and environmental regulation, which guarantees the continued existence of their polluting 
practices (Mol, 2013). These same powerful economic actors are also the ones most likely to influence 
international treaties and policy making and enforcement in developing countries (Michalowski and 
Kramer 1987). Waste from a green-criminology perspective can also include an analysis of how 
informal waste collection and recycling is criminalized (Brisman, 2010; Groombridge, 2013). Especially 
the power imbalance between developing countries and multinational companies – whose gross 
national revenue regularly exceeds that of developing countries - is relevant. Such a perspective invites 
to look at the responsibility for environmental crime throughout the entire supply chain. Both the 
cheap treatment and recycling and the (wasteful) production and product engineering contribute to 
the illegal trade and dumping of e-waste. Producers for instance actively choose to produce products 
with shorter life cycles who are virtually impossible to fix in order to guarantee continued sales 
(planned obsolescence) (Brisman and South, 2013). The responsibility for waste crime and by 
extension pollution lies also with the consumers, who generate massive amounts of waste. Consumers 
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often do not realize how much waste (air pollution, waste water, etc.) is generated for each product. 
Many of those costs are hidden and externalized (White, 2011).  
A green criminological perspective implies that harm and crime are approached through an 
(environmental) justice lens. This pays attention to how the most vulnerable groups in society are 
disproportionately harmed by environmental crime. For waste crimes this refers to the contrast 
between rich and poor, developing and industrialized countries and within industrialized countries 
(Clapp, 2001; Mohai and Saha, 2007; Pellow, 2007). The global South is especially vulnerable due to 
their often weak regulatory system and government, but also their precarious socio-economic 
situation, causing them to accept illegal but financially interesting (hazardous) waste shipments, no 
matter whether they originate in corporate or organized crime constructions. Moreover, the political 
situation might also be one where environmental concerns are not high on the agenda. As a 
consequence, waste traders can shop around for the lowest costs for waste disposal and offer officials 
in poor countries attractive prices or bribes for accepting the (toxic) waste into their lands. Also 
minorities in industrialized countries (e.g. USA) are disproportionately exposed to environmental harm 
resulting from waste fraud (McDowell, 2013; Ozymy and Jarrell, 2015; Stretesky and Lynch, 1998). 
These activities are not necessarily illegal, but definitely harmful (awful but lawful). A green 
criminological approach thus allows us to pay attention to these differences between the Global North 
and South, rich and poor, powerful and powerless, with waste generally produced by the former and 
ending up with the latter.  
Within a green criminology perspective, studies about waste crime are also closely related to those 
about pollution. This refers to pollution caused by the political-economic system – the treadmill of 
production – which accepts harm as ‘inevitable’ to sustain production and consumption processes 
(Lynch et al., 2013). This for instance refers to waste and pollution – environmental harm – resulting 
from activities of the oil and gas industry (Carrington, Donnermeyer, and DeKeseredy, 2014; Jarrell and 
Ozymy, 2012; Opsal and Connor, 2014; Smandych and Kueneman, 2010). Another topic that is 
commonly seen as pollution but actually concerns waste are the plastic islands and micro plastics in 
our oceans (Eriksen et al., 2013). Of course, it is hard to name the culprit for this harm, similar to many 
other topics on the green criminology radar (e.g. climate change) (White, 2015). 
Cases 
A green criminology perspective on waste crime considers diverse types of harm affecting flora, fauna 
and vulnerable groups. A green perspective on waste crime allows for a more radical critique of the 
political economy in explaining and preventing environmental crime (Ruggiero and South 2013). The 
following provides a couple of examples.  
A first example is that of pollution (or waste production) that arises from oil extraction such as that in 
the Nigerian Niger Delta. Oil extraction is a lawful activity that can still result in pollution incidents and 
major environmental harm. For decades, multinational oil companies, through local subsidiaries, have 
been extracting raw oil from the Niger delta. With 550 oil spills in 2014 alone (Amnesty International 
2015), the Niger Delta is faced with chronic environmental and health damage to one of the most bio-
diverse wetlands of Africa and to one of the most densely populated areas of Nigeria. Water, air and 
soil degradation together with light and noise pollution by gas flaring irreparably harmed biodiversity 
and habitats (Nurse 2016). Local fishing and farming – a source of livelihood for the majority of the 
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impoverished population – collapsed (Izarali, 2015). andand This case answers to several of the 
characteristics of corporate waste crimes, but the added relevance of a green perspective lies in the 
attention for the diversity of harms and the attention for systemic causes. The oil production, pollution 
and degradation of the environment went hand in hand with a more general disruption of the region 
through conflict, military violence, human rights abuses and lack of investment in education and health 
care (Bisschop and Janssens 2016). Understanding the causes of the environmental harm in the Niger 
Delta requires an examination of the broader political and economic environment that facilitates these 
harms. About 80 per cent of Nigeria’s state revenue comes from oil and gas extraction and many 
people work for the oil industry. Even though the Nigerian economy is Africa’s biggest (World Bank 
2015), it is ranked very low on the UN’s Human Development Index (UNDP 2015). Oil revenue ends up 
with political elites and does not benefit all citizens (Omgba 2015). The oil industry is also linked to 
several human rights violations, aside from the environmental harm. Legal action in Nigeria is difficult 
because many laws are not publically available and because of the lack of transparency in the legal 
system (UNEP 2011). In 2009, Shell did make a ‘compassionate’ payment of 15.5 million USD to people 
in Ogoniland, without admitting liability for the deaths of several local environmental and human rights 
activists. Several victims, with support of ENGOs, continue to seek redress, but then abroad. A court 
case by relatives of Ogoni environmental and human rights activists which started in 2002 made it to 
the US Supreme Court in 2012 where it was dismissed because of a lack of connection to the USA. The 
same plaintiffs, however, recently started a court case in the Netherlands (de Bruyne, 2017). Friends 
of the Earth, together with four Nigerian farmers, also sued the Dutch headquarters of Shell, for oil 
pollution in three villages inflicted by subsidiary Shell Nigeria. In 2015, the Dutch judiciary found the 
case to be admissible, but the court case about the role of Shell in the oil pollution is still ongoing in 
appeal8. This case illustrates that the causes of environmental harm can be very diverse and are often 
also of a systemic nature. The capitalist dependence on oil as a resource, extracting the oil at virtually 
any cost, is fundamentally at odds with the wellbeing of nature (Stretesky et al 2014). This not only 
rings true in developing countries, but was also demonstrated for the US (Greife and Stretesky, 2013, 
165) where state legislation is more likely to be favourable to oil discharges (pollution) when state 
revenue relies on the oil industry, when more production takes place and when political resistance is 
low.  
An example of waste treatment is the earlier mentioned trafficking of e-waste (Bisschop and Vande 
Walle, 2013). A lot of e-waste, disguised as second hand products,  is shipped to developing countries 
(West Africa and South East Asia) where a large share is (immediately) dismantled to recuperate 
secondary raw materials. This dismantling is done by vulnerable groups (e.g. poor, minors, religious 
minority) and without any means to protect themselves from the toxins9 which are released when 
burning the waste (Eidgenössische Materialprüfungs- und Forschungsanstalt (EMPA), 2009; Sepúlveda 
et al., 2010). E-waste smuggling also causes economic harm because it unfairly competes with the legal 
waste market and because less secondary raw materials are being recycled. As such, it also undermines 
environmental policy and law enforcement (Quadri, 2010).  
                                                          
8 https://www.rechtspraak.nl/Organisatie-en-contact/Organisatie/Gerechtshoven/Gerechtshof-Den-
Haag/Nieuws/Paginas/Nederlandse-rechter-bevoegd-in-proces-tegen-Shell-over-olielekkages-Nigeria.aspx  
9 E-waste often contains lead, flame retardants, beryllium, mercury 
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Implications for crime prevention and control 
A green criminology view on waste crime considers the systemic causes (e.g. politics, economy) and 
pays attention to harm and inequality which also has implications for its approach to crime prevention 
and control strategy, which is in line with that of critical criminology. This means that green 
criminologists focus on exposing and changing the criminogenic nature of political and economic 
systems as well as on specific offenders or crime opportunities. 
A green criminological perspective on crime prevention and control would stress the relevance of the 
interconnectedness of public and private actors (Hall, 2015). Such a perspective builds on the approach 
to waste as organized and as corporate crime, as discussed earlier. It adds to that a discussion about 
possible systemic causes in everyday life. This starts out with the definition of what crime is, which in 
the case of waste fraud has to be interpreted beyond the legal definition. It also implies that harm is 
not limited to human victims but also includes the environment. Moreover, in addition to a criminal 
law or administrative approach, solutions for waste crime are sought earlier on in the entire supply 
chain (producing less waste, consuming fewer products). This means that solutions are found way 
beyond the realm of criminal justice. “Action taken outside of the criminal law to address such harms, 
particularly by way of civil claims, is potentially more effective in achieving redress than the limited 
punishment-based approach of the criminal law” (Nurse 2016: 148). A green perspective inevitably 
brings us to a questioning of the capitalist system with its focus on surplus value in disregard for 
potential environmental consequences (Lynch et al., 2013; Stretesky, Long, and Lynch, 2013). It also 
means the inclusion of the actual costs of production in the price of product, both in terms of water 
usage and recycling costs once the product is discarded (White and Heckenberg, 2014). This approach 
to prevention and control of waste crime is in line with campaigns of several ENGOs (e.g. Greenpeace 
Guide to Greener Electronics; 350.org). Several companies also invest in internalizing the costs and 
limiting waste (e.g. fair phone).  
The question of best practices in prevention and control is partly answered by looking at efforts by 
NGOs and other social movements. This includes campaigns to deal with climate change (e.g. 350.org, 
sing for the climate) or with the harm resulting from oil and gas extraction (keystone XL, fracking) 
(Bradshaw, 2015; White and Kramer, 2015). Sometimes this leads to action research, sometimes 
including judicial procedures, to counter polluters (Jarrell and Ozymy, 2010). A green criminology 
perspective to preventing and controlling waste crime inevitably involves a diverse mix of strategies, 
critically eying the political, social and economic context which shapes environmental crime and its 
governance. Law enforcement plays a secondary role and even then restorative justice is preferred 
over retribution.  
Tackling complex waste crimes 
The above analysis makes clear that waste crime is diverse. It involves corporations who pollute more 
than their license allows for. It includes sub-standard treatment of waste. Sometimes criminal 
organizations are involved when they illegally trade or dump waste. They falsify documents and abuse 
legal commercial structures. Sometimes waste crime also involves governments who fail to 
(effectively) regulate environmental issues. Finally, also consumers are responsible. Thinking about the 
control and prevention of waste crime thus requires us to take into account a diversity of potential 
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perpetrators and responsibilities. It is important to include all links in the waste chain from production 
until final disposal. 
In the inherently global context of the waste industry, waste crime requires agencies to work together 
across institutional and national boundaries (Spapens and Huisman 2016). Transit of hazardous waste 
remains most difficult to police (EnviCrimeNet 2014). Traffic police regularly stop trucks and confiscate 
leaking barrels of battery acid or other chemical substances. However, there is limited judicial follow-
up and the authorities often end up paying for disposal. Oftentimes it is simply treated as an 
administrative offense and therefore not registered in crime statistics (Eurojust, 2014). Licenses and 
inspections are the responsibility of regulatory agencies whereas trade is regulated by customs. Data 
exchange between these agencies is a challenge, despite the fact that much of the policy on waste is 
directed by the EU (Bisschop 2014). This requires a mix of administrative and criminal approaches, 
which increasingly takes place within nation states but will require considerable effort to achieve on 
an international level.  
The British Environment Agency has intensely focused on waste fraud over the last decade and have 
successfully prosecuted over 30 cases involving companies and their directors (Rucevska et al. 2015). 
They implemented an intelligence led policing approach to reduce illegal exports of hazardous waste 
(Securing Compliant Waste Exports Project) (Gibbs, McGarrell, and Sullivan 2015). This project was 
successful in implementing this policing strategy, despite the challenges inherent to policing 
environmental crime (Biermann and Pattberg 2008). By linking enforcement and regulatory 
information they guided intelligence and addressed environmental crime on the national level. As this 
intelligence led policing project evaluation showed, combining regulatory and enforcement data can 
guide better intelligence gathering and result in successful prosecution (Gibbs, McGarrell, and Sullivan 
2015). This was successful on the national level, but application in other countries (with different 
geographic, political and economic conditions) would require adaptations. Applying this on an 
international level brings specific challenges that are typical for international cooperation, such as 
insufficient resources, exchanging information and guarantees for the security of that intelligence or 
the challenge of cooperating across jurisdictions. The globalization of business practices – in the waste 
sector and others – makes smart regulation a challenge (Gibbs, McGarrell, and Axelrod 2010). The 
analysis and governance of waste crime on mere national level clashes with the international character 
of the waste industry. A better harmonization of waste policy and especially its implementation might 
result in better insights into who is involved in waste crime and how better to prevent and control it. 
In addition to that, there are challenges which are typical for environmental crime such as a 
traditionally more compliance rather than crime control oriented regulatory strategy (Pink 2013; Pink 
and White, 2015). Another challenge is that nation states are often faced with opposition when they 
want to regulate business (Rothe 2010).  
Given the inherent limitations of dealing with waste crime through retributive justice, a focus on 
prevention is crucial. A theoretical model that is popular with policy makers in dealing with traditional 
crimes is the situational crime prevention model (Clarke 1992). Recently, this model was applied to 
organized crime and corporate crime (Benson and Madensen, 2007; Bullock et al., 2010). Even though 
this model is successful in dealing with illegal poaching, it has not yet resulted in promising prevention 
strategies for waste crime (Huisman and van Erp, 2013). 
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The prevention and control of waste crime holds opportunities for cooperation among different actors 
(companies, governments, NGOs). There is reason to be hopeful, especially about more community 
oriented approaches to waste crime, next to the more formalized ones. Slovenia for instance saw an 
increase in detection of environmental crime in 2009, which can most likely be explained by a national 
NGO campaign that invited citizens and authorities to report cases of illegal waste dumping (Eman, 
2013). A Greenpeace report revealed that the electronics originating from Dutch companies were 
dumped in Ghana, after which the Dutch Environmental Inspectorate attempted to trace the 
companies that had disposed of the equipment to sanction them. In this case, the attempts were 
unsuccessful, but by using Greenpeace’s information, the Inspectorate sent a signal that it is willing to 
cooperate with NGOs and to back up NGO monitoring actions with law enforcement (van Erp and 
Huisman, 2010). Also fieldwork in Ghana about the (il)legal trade in e-waste (Bisschop 2015) made 
clear that NGO campaigns can positively influence awareness of both authorities and citizens about 
the harms resulting from substandard dismantling and burning of electronics. 
Conclusion 
 
Waste can be more cheaply dealt with by illegal enterprises who disregard environmental regulations 
as well as by legal companies who treat waste they are not licensed for with potential partnerships 
between the two (Ruggiero and South 2010). The term ‘organized crime’ for labelling waste crime 
might indeed be less accurate than the concept ‘illegal enterprise’, where businesses, authorities and 
organized criminals interact (Ruggiero and South 2010; Chambliss 1978). Labelling waste crime as 
either corporate or organized crime has significant crime control and prevention consequences. 
Corporate crime is mostly dealt with by better regulating and monitoring companies in legitimate 
markets, whereas organized crime is mostly countered by using criminal law to target entrepreneurs 
operating in criminal markets. From a policy perspective, organized or corporate makes a whole world 
of difference. Waste as corporate crime brings with it a range of regulatory options. Waste as organized 
crime mandates the international police organizations to make it a priority. The challenge is in bridging 
those two approaches. Waste crime as environmental crime prioritizes the environment no matter 
who bears responsibility for the harm, whether these are corporations, organized crime groups, 
governments or consumers. This also explicitly talks about the inequality between the Global North 
and South, rich and poor, powerful and powerless. This implies that avoiding environmental harm 
requires structural and cultural changes of mentality and behaviour. The challenge lies in finding a 
strategy for the prevention and control of waste crimes that incorporates these three perspectives.  
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